enhancing economic efficiency and also with protecting consumers from paying more as a result of illegally acquired market power: the 'wealth transfer' or 'protecting consumers' property from theft by market power' reason for competition law. 3 What does the Obama Administration believe? It is too early to tell, but it is possible that its overriding concern will be different from prior administrations. Of course it will care about efficiency and about consumers paying higher prices, but it might well use as its loadstar an approach focusing on consumer choice. The consumer choice approach began being utilized during the Clinton and Bush administrations, and it often has been used by the European Union. 4 But it might well be used even more during the Obama Administration.
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The Clinton Administration did not adhere to any one specific approach and, during its eight years, did not speak with one voice on the subject. Efficiency was a large part of its concern, and there was no inclination to return in any way to a 'big is bad/small is good' philosophy. But it also was concerned with prices to consumers, or 'wealth transfers' from consumers to firms with market power. (When cartels raise prices they cause not only allocative inefficiency, they also cause a transfer of wealth from consumers to firms with market power. RH Lande, 'Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency
Interpretation Challenged ' (1982) 35 Hastings Law Journal 101-105.) This is the theft explanation for antitrust or competition law, and it asserts that these laws are at their core about corporations stealing consumers' property -consumers' surplus. Cartels are undesirable because they unfairly raise prices to consumers above the competitive level and thereby represent a taking of consumers' property by the cartel. Id. at 96.)
Perhaps surprisingly, this same theft or wealth transfer approach also has been adopted by the U.S. antitrust cases were all decided in favor of the defendants, one might think that the U.S. Supreme Court had endorsed the efficiency paradigm. But these cases may be explained better by a concern with protecting consumers from paying supracompetitive prices than they are with efficiency. Efficiency is important to the Court, but the transfer seems to be even more important. Id. 4 See infra fn 38 and 39. 3 This article will (1) define the consumer choice approach to competition law or antitrust law and show how it differs from other approaches; (2) discuss the types of situations where a consumer choice focus is likely to make a difference in enforcement outcomes, producing better results than the other paradigms; (3) show that another important advantage of using the consumer choice approach would be to nudge decisions in the right direction; and (4) offer a brief overview of implementation issues.
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What is the 'consumer choice' approach to competition law?
If you examine every type of competition law or antitrust law violation, from price fixing to predation, and ask what they have in common, the answer is they all significantly restrict consumer choice. Every violation significantly and artificially distorts or diminishes the choices that otherwise would be offered by the free market. 5 This does not mean everything that significantly reduces consumer choice is, or should be, a violation of competition laws.
But if you examine what these violations have in common, it is that they significantly reduce consumer choice.
How does a consumer choice approach differ from either a price approach or an efficiency approach? It is broader than both, and includes both. First, it includes price considerations because consumers should be able to choose from among the price options a free market would provide. Additionally, it encompasses the wealth transferred from 5 For example collusion, including price fixing, and the division of markets and customers, diminish the choices -usually the price choices -available to consumers, and replace price choices determined by competition with price choices determined by collusion. By contrast, procompetitive joint ventures leading to new or less expensive products do not restrict consumer choice. A second example is anticompetitive mergers, which can produce too few firms in the marketplace and thus lead to fewer choices than the free market would offer. Also, monopolization through predation also artificially reduces the choices available to consumers. For an analysis of every antitrust violation in choice terms see RH Lande, 'Consumer Choice as the Ultimate Goal of Antitrust',
62 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 503, at 506-508. 4 consumers to firms acquiring market power (the belief that when cartels raise prices above the competitive level this constitutes the theft of consumers' property). The consumer choice approach also includes efficiency considerations, especially the innovation concern, because optimal innovation gives rise to optimal consumer choice. Because cost savings efficiencies can affect price, these considerations are included as well. But most important, the consumer choice approach also gives a high priority to other consumer concerns such as competition in terms of quality, variety, service, and privacy. Normally this is indeed true. Normally there is no difference between a choice approach and a price approach, and therefore little benefit to using a choice standard. For example, suppose there were four firms that made cookies, that three firms are enough to have price competition, and that three firms could make them at the same cost as four. If consumers want twenty different types of cookies, or 200, three firms should be able to supply them just as well as four. If two of the four firms wanted to merge, there would be no advantage to using a choice standard over a price standard or an efficiency standard to assess this merger.
But sometimes it would make a difference. There are three broad categories of cases where a choice analysis could lead to a different (and in each case superior) result: cases in markets with little or no price competition; cases involving conduct that increase consumers' search costs or otherwise impairs their decisionmaking ability; and cases in markets in which firms compete primarily through independent product development and creativity, rather than through price.
Markets lacking serious price competition
The first group of cases involves conduct in markets with little or no price competition as a result of regulation, industrywide joint ventures, or third party payers. In these situations there 7 is no way properly to assess consumer welfare without focusing explicitly on non-price issues.
First, consider markets where prices are regulated. For example, airlines in the United
States, before they were deregulated, competed in terms of quality and service, as demonstrated by their intense competition over the quality of the meals they served. 11 A price analysis of this market would have been seriously incomplete. One even could ask why the United States did not permit every airline to merge during the period when their rates were regulated. After all, they could not have raised prices. The answer is that we wanted non-price competition.
Now consider a market where all the significant firms were allowed to merge.
Montgomery County, Maryland, allowed both of its major taxicab companies to merge, on the theory that prices were regulated so there could be no harm from this merger. 12 Unfortunately, as a result of these mergers service and quality went down significantly. 13 This example illustrates that even if prices are regulated, competition often leads to better service, and the potential harm to consumers in these markets from a lack of competition often are extremely difficult to quantify in price terms. as a necessary part of their operations, and also involved activity that limited consumer choice. In these cases it would have been meaningless to decide whether the joint venture was procompetitive or anticompetitive by only focusing on price terms because there was only limited price competition in the relevant markets. In each case there was, however, significant non-price competition between the firms that entered into the joint venture. Consumers could pick from among the firms in the market on the basis of service, quality, or another dimension of competition. Alternatively, one could ask why all the firms in these joint venture cases
were not allowed to merge since they were setting joint prices already? The answer is that we wanted to preserve choice competition.
Third, consider cases involving third party payers. 17 Whenever their bills are paid by someone else, consumers are likely to care more about quality, service, and variety than price.
If a person knows their medical or car repair bills will be paid by their insurance company, for example, a price model would be woefully inadequate at explaining their behavior.
Conduct that increase consumers' search costs or otherwise impairs their decisionmaking ability.
A second broad category of cases when a consumer choice approach will work better involves conduct that increase consumers' search costs or otherwise impairs their decisionmaking ability. This conduct tends to cause consumers to obtain products or services less suited to their needs, at a cost higher in terms of the value of consumers' time, in addition to adversely impacting price. In each instance, efficiencies were claimed for the practices. Depending upon the case, the efficiencies were more, or less, believable.
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If practices such as these were evaluated under the rule of reason, the negative effects of the practices -both the higher prices and the deleterious effects of consumers obtaining an engineer, lawyer, optician, or automobile that was suboptimal for their purposes -should be balanced against the practices' efficiencies. If only the negative price effects were included in this tradeoff, the balance easily could come out in favor of the restraint. However, a tradeoff that included the negative effects on consumer choice, as well as the negative price effects, would more accurately measure the effects of the restrictions on overall consumer welfare.
2.3
Markets in which firms compete primarily through independent product development and creativity, rather than through price. Id.
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Finally, there are some markets in which firms compete primarily through independent product development and creativity, rather than through price. These markets may involve high-tech innovation or editorial independence in the news media. Effective competition in these industries may sometimes require more independent centers of decisionmaking than are required to ensure price competition, so market concentration principles taken from a price context may not ensure robust competition in the respects that are actually most relevant to consumers. In these cases, competition law decisionmakers should focus upon artificially diminished consumer choice even if prices are competitive. For this reason, in these markets a price standard is inadequate.
For example, the media is an area where society cares a great deal about independent judgment, decisionmaking and creativity. Suppose there were only four remaining media firms of a particular type (such as book publishers, TV, radio or magazine owners) and that two of them wanted to merge. Suppose they could guarantee that the prices of the remaining three firms would remain competitive following the merger. Should society approve this merger? Or would society fear the artificially diminished choice that can result from fewer independent sources of opinion and information? If so, some large media mergers might well be evaluated differently under a choice standard than a price standard.
It might be instructive to contrast a media merger with the earlier example of a conventional merger of cookie making firms. Recall the example where there were only four firms that made cookies, and three would be enough to yield effective price competition. If consumers want twenty or 200 different types of cookies the remaining three firms should supply them. For a hypothetical four to three cookie merger there would be no advantage to using a choice standard over a price standard or an efficiency standard. The key difference is that the owners of the cookie companies don't care which cookies their customers eat, so they will produce whatever kinds of cookies consumers want.
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In contrast, owners of the media might have distinct preferences concerning the editorial content of the news. Within limits they may be able to add their own slant to coverage. Moreover, the media owners might have unconscious biases and presuppositions, so even if they have the best intention they might not be able to supply the full range of views.
While companies easily can make many different types of cookies, it is much more difficult to hold all sorts of different worldviews. These situations should be evaluated explicitly and directly as to whether research that might lead to new and better products will be enhanced or eliminated. Price effects also should be evaluated, but a consumer choice approach would, quite properly, intensify the focus on products that might never be invented but for the merger or joint venture. The practices at issue mostly affect non-price competition, so competition law should focus on these issues explicitly. Doing so might sometimes result in the recognition that more firms are needed for innovation or perspective competition than for price competition.
Each network called the state of Florida wrong twice -once for each candidate. Why the uniformity of incorrect results? Previously six election prediction organizations existed independently, but they gradually combined the entirety of their election polling and prediction operations to form the VNS. This produced significant cost saving efficiencies. Did it also have negative effects on prices? It is extremely difficult to find any significant price effects. Whether VNS charged the six news organizations a monopoly price is irrelevant since the six news organizations owned it.
Unfortunately, due to their combination there was no effective competition in terms of choice of information, quality, perspective, or variety of approaches to election prediction. If the VNS were analyzed under the rule of reason, and all that was balanced was its considerable cost savings against its non-existent or highly uncertain price effects, VNS probably would survive an antitrust challenge. But if the balance weighed these cost savings against both the dubious price effects and also the far more certain decrease in quality, fewer independent approaches to election prediction, and less viewer choice, then the case might well come out differently. If there had been competition among six (or even between two) election polling or prediction organizations, the predictions might have been more accurate, and viewer choice would have been greater. Id.
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Implementation Issues
Competition law cannot seriously consider adopting an overall approach unless it can be implemented in a relatively objective, predictable manner. How does the choice focus compare to the other approaches in terms of predictability? What are the guiding principles for determining how much weight to give to significant decreases in consumer choice? How can we conduct the analysis relatively objectively?
Mergers seem to be the easiest place to discuss implementation issues. The United
States Merger Guidelines express concern with the price effects of mergers twelve times, and in a footnote, acknowledge that mergers also can reduce quality, variety, and innovation.
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Even the Efficiency section of the Guidelines largely focuses on cost savings rather than innovation. 30 But, suppose the Guidelines made innovation and the resulting consumer choices a higher priority. As a practical matter, how could it do this optimally?
The best solution might be for the Merger Guidelines explicitly to say there were certain types of markets (including technology, media, fashion, entertainment, etc.) where the need for innovation or perspective competition means that a larger number of firms may be required to have effective choice competition. Mergers in these markets might be evaluated in terms of different concentration levels or different changes in concentration levels.
Alternatively, if the enforcers were reluctant to explicitly say that different structural standards should apply to certain markets, as a practical matter consumer choice concerns could be accommodated into merger analysis in these markets in three different ways.
First, choice considerations could simply be used as a tie-breaker or plus factor. If a decisionmaker were deciding the legality of a media merger, for example, and if they were on 29 Id. at 188, fn 41.
30
Id. at 187-188.
14 the margin as to whether to challenge a transaction if they only considered price effects, choice considerations could cause them to make a different decision.
Second, and very similarly, choice considerations could be used as an implicit factor that would operate within the current structure of the Merger Guidelines. Suppose that for industries where price competition was most important, the enforcers would challenge 20% of above-Guideline mergers. But perhaps for those industries where consumer choice issues were especially crucial -for mergers involving sectors such as high tech industries, media, entertainment, or fashion -the enforcers would block 40% of above-Guideline mergers. To implement choice concerns this way, as an informal part of the enforcers' discretion, the concentration levels and changes in the Guidelines would not be changed. But the Guidelines would be enforced more vigorously whenever choice competition was especially important.
Third, the Merger Guidelines could make choice analysis a separate explicit factor in the merger review process. Under this approach, a merger should be challenged either if it were likely to lead to higher prices, or if it were likely to lead to significantly less consumer choice because the merger was likely to hinder innovation (the most important factor that determines consumer choice in the long run).
As a practical matter this would mean that the merger investigation and decision would make a separate, high priority, inquiry into both the price and the innovation effects of the merger. This is similar to the way that innovation is already a separate factor in the Federal Collaboration Among Competitors Guidelines. 31 This inquiry sometimes could lead to a different result from the current price oriented inquiry, especially because not every company within an industry competes substantially through innovation. Some firms instead largely compete by making existing products less expensively, by superior marketing, by superior service, etc. This method of inquiry would be different from attempting to predict whether a particular merger would be likely to lead to more, or to less, innovation (another 31 Id. at 242, fn 250.
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possible inquiry for the enforcers). Rather, it would mean attempting to ascertain whether particular firms historically had been centers of independent innovation.
Here is how this inquiry could work. Suppose an industry consisted of five firms; A, B, C, D, and E. Suppose the enforcers believe that three firms are enough to have effective price competition in this market, and also that three firms is enough for effective innovation competition. But suppose that only firms A, B and C compete significantly by innovating, that only these three have large research and development budgets, that only these three have a history of making significant innovations. Suppose that firms D and E compete in other ways -perhaps they are imitators that make existing products less expensively. Suppose that firms A and B (two of the firms that compete by innovating) want to merge. Under price analysis we should permit this merger because after the merger there would still be four firms left, and it is stipulated that three firms is enough for effective price competition.
But under choice analysis we should block the merger because it is likely to lead to less innovation, the long term source of optimal consumer choice. Regardless which number of firms we believe is necessary for effective competition, choice analysis could lead to tougher merger enforcement. This is analogous to a unilateral effects analysis, which proposes that we should be especially tough on mergers between two firms producing goods within the same niche of a relevant market, and more lenient on mergers between firms producing dissimilar goods. Choice analysis arguably also could be said to create a 'submarket' consisting of innovators, or an 'innovation market', within a broader market. Id. at 215-216. The consumer choice approach also has the advantage of explaining accurately and simply, in a way that everyone can understand, why competition is good for consumer welfare. It is the best, the most intuitive way, to explain the advantages of free competition to a diverse array of audiences, including judges, legislators, the media, and the public.
As a final example, to show how much clearer and easier to understand the choice formulation is, and how awkward and non-intuitive the other approaches to competition policy can be, consider an old case brought by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission ('FTC') 34 In addition, the Choice approach will not lead to a worse analysis than a price or efficiency approach.
See generally NW Averitt and RH Lande, 'Using The "Consumer Choice" Approach to Antitrust Law ' (2007) against firms' jointly set advertising restrictions concerning the safety of bulletproof vests.
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A trade association of manufacturers of bulletproof vests adopted a rule that it was unethical for members to advertise safety or to claim their products were safer. The FTC's concern was that without safety advertising consumers might purchase bullet-proof vests that were less safe than they would prefer.
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Would anyone be satisfied if their bullet proof vest performed poorly so long as it was sold at a competitive price? In theory, we could translate safety harms caused by advertising restrictions into price harms or efficiency harms using complex Procrustean intellectual gymnastics. But, wouldn't it be better for the enforcers to straightforwardly say that consumers care about safety, so the enforcers were going to focus on that form of competition explicitly?
The Bush Administration was dominated by the belief that competition laws only should be analyzed in terms of economic efficiency. choice, quality and innovation will leave the market.' Id. at para 6. 'In this document, the expression "increase prices" includes the power to maintain prices above the competitive level and is used as shorthand for the various ways in which the parameters of competition -such as prices, output innovation, the variety or quality of goods or services -can be influenced for the profit of the dominant undertaking and to the detriment of consumers.' Id. at para 11. Additionally, the reported clarified that '[t]he aim of the Commission's enforcement activity in relation to exclusionary conduct is to ensure that dominant undertakings do not impair effective competition by foreclosing their rivals in an anticompetitive way and thus having an adverse impact on consumer welfare, whether in the form of higher price levels than would have otherwise prevailed or in some other form such as limiting quality or reducing consumer choice.' Id. at para 19. 19 the international community could at least think about working together towards a common understanding about the primary goal of competition policy.
